This paper proposes a new construction of the minimum knowledge undeniable signature scheme which solves a problem inherent in Chaum's scheme. We formulate a new proof system, the minimum knowledge interactive bi-proof system, and a pair of languages, the common witness problem, based on the random self-reducible problem. And we show that any common witness problem has the minimum knowledge interactive biproof system. A practical construction for undeniable signature schemes is proposed based on such a proof system. These schemes assure signature confirmation and disavowal with the same protocol (or at the same time).
Introduction
Digital signatures [DH] are one of the most important concepts of modern cryptography, and have many applications in information security systems.
A new paradigm of signature schemes, undeniable signatures, was recently proposed by Chaum et al. [CA, Ch] , and its properties are different from those of digikal signatures. Although an undeniable signature is similar to a digital signature in that it is a number issued by a signer that is related to the signer's public-key and his message, the difference is that an undeniable signature cannot be verified without tl-9 cooperation of the signer.
Undeniable signature schemes [CA, Ch] consist of two parts, a confirmation protocol and a disavowal protocol. In the confirmation protocol, a verifier can verify the validity of a signature by interacting with the signer, and there is no chance that the signer can falsely represent the validity of an invalid signature. If the validity test fails, the verifier can determine if the signature is invalid or the signer is false by the disavowal protocol.
Chaum's scheme [Ch] has a problem, in which two different protocols are necessary for the confirmation and disavowal of the signature. If a dishonest prover, say, Alice claims that her valid signature is not valid, then first the verifier, say, Bob must execute the disavowal protocol to check her claim, then knows that her claim is not true. However, Bob cannot believe that her signature is valid just from this negative result of the disavowal protocol, because Alice may not follow the valid disavowal protocol. So, Bob must execute the confirmation protocol to determine that her signature is valid. Therefore, in the above case, Bob must execute the both protocols to confirm the validity of her signature.
This paper proposes a new undeniable signature scheme which solves the above problem of Chaum's scheme. That is, our scheme aSSures signature confirmation and disavowal with the same protocol. In other words, executing our scheme once is equivalent to executing both confirmation and disavowal protocols at the same time. Hence, without regard to signer's claim, the verifier can always determine whether a signature is valid or invalid, through executing our scheme only once.
First, in order to construct our undeniable signature scheme, we formulate a class of new proof systems, the interactive bi-proof systems, which can exactly determine which of z E L1 or z E Lz is a true theorem where L1 and L2 are disjoint languages.
Roughly speaking, when z E L1, a prover can prove "x is in LI", however no prover can prove "z is in L1" when z 4 L1. On the other hand, when z E L2, the prover can prove ''z is in L2" with the same protocol, however no prover can prove ''2 is in L2" when x 4 L2.
Next, based on the random self-reducible problem [TW] , we introduce a pair of languages, the common witness problem, and show that any common witness problem has the minimum knowledge interactive bi-proof system. Here, the minimum knowledge [GHY] is a variant of zero-knowledge. For example, in a zero-knowledge proof, the prover releases the knowledge such as ''5 E L", while in a minimum knowledge proof, the prover releases the knowledge such as which one is correct, ''z E L1" or "z E Lz".
Finally, we propose new undeniable signature schemes, which solve the abovementioned problem of Chaum's scheme, by using these minimum knowledge interactive bi-proof systems for a common witness problem. In addition, several variations of our scheme are discussed in terms of increasing efficiency and useful applications.
Interactive Bi-Proof System
First we formulate a new proof system for our undeniable signature scheme.
In interactive proof systems [GMR] , a prover has infinite power while the verifier is restricted to probabilistic polynomial time bounded. They interact to perform a proof 'x E L' for a language L. When x E L, the proof is accomplished; however, when z 4 L, no prover can claim that "I is in L" and such proof is rejected.
This property approximates that of signature schemes. That is, when a signature is valid, the signer can prove it. When, however, the signature is not valid, no signer can prove its validity.
To (P', V), V halts and accepts x its "x is in LI" with a probability of at most 1zI-t o For each, k, for sufficiently large z $ ! La, for any ITM P', on input z to (P', V), V halts and accepts z as ' ' z is in Lz" with a probability of at most 1xI-k.
(The probabilities here are taken over the coin tosses of P' and V . )
Next we define the minimum knowledgeness of this proof system. Definition 2.2 Let ( P , V ) be an interactive bi-proof system for (LllL2). We say that (P, V ) is minimum knowledge if, given any expected polynomial time probabilistic Turing machine V ' , there exists another probabilistic Turing machine Mv,, running in expected polynomial time, such that for all I E L1 U Lz:
is aprobability distribution where B ( s ) is the output ofinteractive protocol (PI V ) and the distribution probability are taken over the coin tosses of P and V.
M~I has onetime access to an oracle, as follows. Given any input x and auxiliary i n p u t h, Mv, queries the oracle with input x; the oracle returns a value dstributed according B( z ) .
0 The ensembles
and are indistinguishable.
(If the ensembles are identical, we say that the bi-proof system is perfectly minimum knowledge. ) See [GMR, GHY] for the definitions of interactive protocol, I T M , minimum knowledgeness, VIEW, and indistinguishability.
3 Interactive Bi-Proof System and Random Self-
Reducibility
In this section, we show the essential conditions of the interactive bi-proof system. First, we explain random self-reducibility [TW] . Rl.
R2.
R3.
If the bits of r are random, uniform and independent, then x' is uniformly dis-
There is a polynomial time algorithm that, given N , x , P , and any y' E RN(x'), outputs y E R N ( x ) . Here F is the finite prefix of r consumed in computing
There is a polynomial time algorithm that, given N , x , r, and any y E R N ( x ) , outputs some y' E R N ( z ' ) . If, in addition, the bits o f ? are random, uniform, and independent, then y' is uniformly distributed on RN(z').
Based on the above problem, we define the following problem.
a.re called the common witness problem.
(Note that in this case, L R and Lc are disjoint, and LR n L p = LR. )
Now we can obtain the following theorem about the relation of the interactive bi-proof system and the common witness problem.
Theorem 3.3 Let the relation 4,) and 4 2 ) be random self-reducible and satisfy the following conditions: N ( X (~) , N ) , the number of z satisfying ( 5 , y) E 4 , )~ is one, and there are probabilistic polynomial time algorithms B(,) that, given N, y, output z satisfying ( 2 , y) E R (,) ,N where i =1 and 2.
There are probabilistic polynomial time algorithms that, given N, output random pairs (2, y) E q , ) ,~ with 2 uniformly distributed over dom R(,),N and y uniformly distributed over Z+,) ,N(z) where i = I and 2.
T3. If (t, y ) 4 R(,),N, then for any r , (z', y') $2 R. (,) ,N (i = I and 2) where 5' is created from z and r , and y' is created from y and T .
T2.

T4. R (~) , N ( X ( I ) , N )
= + ) , N ( X (~) , N ) , and any y' created from y and T on 4 1 )~ is equal to the one created from y and r on 4 2 )~. 
3Y [ ( Z I , Y) E R(I),N
T5.
T6.
Then, on inputs N and x = (xl, z2), there is a minimum knowledge interactive bi-proof system (PI V) for any common witness problem ( L R , Lc).
Sketch of Proof:
We consider the following protocol. Without loss of generality, there exists (xl, yl) R ( I ) , N from the definition of Lp.
Pro t o c o 1:
Step 1 Repeat t times from Step 2 to Step 7 where t = O(Jz1).
Step 2 P generates random numbers r, a, v ( 1 . 1 = 1x21 = n), and calculates XI, 2, Step 3 V generates random number u ( 1 . 1 = 1 .
2 1 = n ) , and sends u to P.
Step 4 P calculates q = u @ w and X 2 ,
x 2 = h,G4(2)(N, 2 2 , r)).
And P sends X2 and a , v to V. Here, function h, is a hard-core predicate or hard-core function shown in Definitions 2 and 3 of [GL] , where 191 = 1A(2)(N, z2, r)l when h, is a hard-core predicate, and 191 = 21A(2)(N, z2, r ) ( when h, is a hard-core function. Hereafter, for simplicity, we will consider h, a hard-core predicate. Then, h,(w) = C:=l w;q; mod 2, where
Step 5 V checks whether BC(w,a) holds. If it does not hold, V rejects the proof. Otherwise, V calculates q = u @ w, generates random bit e, and sends it to P.
Step 6 P calculates Y. Y = r if e =. 0,
Here yi E R ( l ) ,~( z i ) (z: = A(1)(N, 21, r)) is created from y1 and r. And P sends it to V .
Step 7 V check. as follows:
When e = 0, V checks the following equations x1 A A(l)(N, 2 1 , Y ) ,
X2 h,(42)(N, 3 2 , Y ) ) .
If both tests succeed, set this round as "honest" and continue the p r e tocol.
Otherwise V rejects the proof. If both tests succeed, set this round as ('LA" and continue the protocol. If only first test succeeds, set this round as "Lc" and continue the protocol .
Otherwise V rejects the proof.
Step 8 After t rounds, V determines the proof as follows:
If every round is either "LR" or "honest", then V accepts as "x E LR". If every round of e = 0 is "honest" and R > 1/3, then V accepts as "z E Lc", where R = #{"Lc" round}/#{"e = 1" round}. (#S denotes the number of elements of set S. )
Remark:
hen h, is a hard-core function (or 1 x 2 1 > l), V determines the proof as "t E Lc"
as follows: When lX21 is O(\zl), if every round is either " L C " or "honest", then V accepts as "Z E Lc". When 1 x 2 1 is c = 0(1), if every round of e = 0 is "honest" and
Consider the completeness and soundness conditions.
Completeness
o In the case of z E L R , there exists some y, such that (x1,y) E Rjl),N A (x2,y) E R(2),N. Then, it is clear that if P follows the protocol, then both checks in
Step 7 are accomplished. So V accepts as "z is in LR" with probability 1.
o On the other hand, when 2 E Lc, y where (zl,y) E f t l ) ,~ does not satisfy ( x 2 , y) E q 2 ) , N . Condition T3 directly implies that P's response Y ~ cannot satisfy X, = h q ( + ) ( N , Y ) ) in Step 7 with probability 1/2 in each round.
So V accepts as "z is in Lc" with overwhelming probability after t rounds repetition.
Soundness o In the case of x # LR, to cheat V with non-negligible Probability, P' must create the messages X I , X 2 and Y which satisfy both tests in Step 7, i.e., e = 0 and e = 1. When z @ LR, two cases are considered, z E LG or x @ L p . First we consider z E Lc. In this case, for all y where ( t I , y ) E R j l ) ,~, this y must not satisfy ( 2 2 ,~) E 4 2 1 ,~ from the definition of Lc and condition "5. To cheat V , Y that is created from y and T , however, must satisfy X 2 = h q ( B ( 2 , ( N , Y ) ) with probability 1. For this, ( X 2 , Y ) E R(2),N must be satisfied, since q is randomly generated after T is determined. This contradicts condition T3. Step 7-2 (e = 1) and both tests in Step 7-1 (e = 0). In this case, two cases are also considered, z E L R or z $ L p . First we consider z E LR. In this case, for all y where (z1, y) E R (~) , N , this y must satisfy (z2, y) E R (~) , N from the definition of LR and condition T5.
To cheat V, Y that is created from y and r , however, must not satisfy X 2 = hq(B (2)(N, Y) ) with probability 1/2 in each round. For this, ( X 2 , Y) E q2),N must not be satisfied with at least non-negligible probability. This contradicts the condition T5.
On the other hand, when z # L p , there is no y where (21, y) E q l ) ,~. So if Y satisfies (Xl, Y ) E R f l ) ,~, this contradicts condition T3.
a Minimum knowledgeness
Then we prove the minimum knowledgeness. First, on input z E L R U Lc, the simulator accesses to an oracle and knows z E L R or z E Lc. After that it simulates the view of the history by the 'standard guessing' algorithm.
When I E LR, it is clear that the simulator can perfectly simulate the view, or that this protocol satisfies perfect minimum knowledgeness.
When z 4 Lc, to prove that this protocol is (computationally) minimum knowledge, we must show that (XI, X 2 , q ) is (computationally) indistinguishable from (Xl, a, q), where a is a real random number. If BC is a secure bit-commitment function and the prover is honest, then q is a random number. If the common witness problem is not BPP, then a bit-commitment function BC exists [Na, ILL] .
From condition T6 and Lemma 1 of [GL] , if the common witness problem to be proven in this bi-proof system is not in BPP, then (XI, X,) is computationally indistinguishable from (XI, a). Then, this protocol is (computationally) minimum knowledge. If the common witness problem is in BPP, this protocol is trivially (perfectly) minimum knowledge.
Remark 1:
If the common witness problem is defined over the discrete logarithm problem, then condition T6 holds, because the problem, given g z , mz, to check 3r [ gz+' A mz+'] is equivalent to the problem to check 32 [ g ' A mZ].
Remark 2:
In the above protocol (sequential version), q is generated in each round. However, in the parallel (five round) version of the above protocol [FFS, BMO] , the same q is commonly used by all t round messages. So, the communication amount of these parallel versions is much reduced than that of the sequential version.
Remark 3:
The discrete logarithm problem and the graph isomorphism problem are good examples of problems that satisfy the above conditions.
Application to Undeniable Signature Schemes
Proposed Undeniable Signature Schemes
We apply the interactive bi-proof system directly to an undeniable signature scheme.
From Theorem 3.3, if a random self-reducible problem exists, then there exists an interactive bi-proof system. The definition of the interactive bi-proof system is suitable for undeniable signature schemes, so there exists an undeniable signature scheme based on the random self-reducible problem.
We consider the discrete logarithms problem similar to those in [CA, Ch] .
Center Key Generation
o Center generates a large prime number p and selects a primitive root g of field GF(p).
Signer Key generation
o Signer generates his secret key 2, and computes y (= gz mod p ) . He p u b lishes y as his public key. o After t rounds, verifier determines the validity of (n, s) as follows:
* If every round is either "valid" or "honest", then verifier accepts as "s is the valid signature of n".
* If every round of e = 0 is "honest" and R > 113, then verifier accepts as "s is the invalid signature of n", where R = #{"invalid" round}/#{ "e = 1" round}.
* Otherwise verifier rejects the protocol.
This protocol satisfies minimum knowledge interactive bi-proof system.
Remark
haum's confirmation and disavowal protocols are called zeTo knowledge; however, our protocol is called minimum knowledge. In both schemes, these words mean that each protocol releases no additional knowledge except that which the prover wants to release. The different point is as follows:
In Chaum's scheme, to prove the validity of a signature, signer Alice claims the validity/invalidity of her signature before using the confirmation/disavowal protocol. To support her claim she then uses the appropriate protocol. In this sequence, the protocols release no additional bit than her claim, so each confirmation/disavowd protocol of his scheme is zero knowledge.
However in our scheme, regardless of the signature's claim, a signer executes the same protocol. Our protocol releases one bit, i.e., the validity or invalidity, so our scheme is minimum knowledge.
Efficiency
Our scheme is more efficient than Chaum's because our scheme consists of only one protocol. It implies that when this scheme is implemented, the confirmation and disavowal protocol can be done with the same equipment. Furthermore, in this protocol, the number of powering and multiplication oF.trations are smaller than that of the disavowal protocol in Chaum's scheme [Ch] .
For even more efficiency, we are proposing two enhancements, one is the higher degree version and another is the parallel version. Unfortunately these protocols cannot be proven to satisfy minimum knowledgeness, however, both can decrease the amount of transmission overhead.
To satisfy minimum knowledgeness in the parallel version, the constant round zero knowledge technique shown in [BMO] can be applied to our scheme. This can reduce the round number of the protocol. Moreover, as described in Remark 2 of Theorem 3.3, the parallel version reduce the communication amount as well as the round number, since the same q is commonly used by all 1 round messages.
Conclusion
We have proposed a new proof system, the minimum knowledge interactive bi-proof system, and constructed an undeniable signature scheme using a formulation of the new system.
We have also defined a pair of languages, the common witness problem, based on the random self-reducible problem, and shown that any common witness problem has the minimum knowledge interactive bi-proof system.
A practical undeniable signature scheme was proposed based on such a proof system, in which confirmation and disavowal can be done with the same protocol (or at the same time).
